Framing the Frames: A Theoretical Framework for the Cognitive Notion of “Frames of Reference”

Ernst R. Wendland

Ernst Wendland has been an instructor at the Lutheran Seminary in Lusaka, Zambia, since 1968. He is a United Bible Societies Translation Consultant, emeritus, and is currently affiliated as a visiting professor in the Department of Ancient Studies with the Centre for Bible Interpretation and Translation at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Abstract

In this exposition I seek to provide a theoretical background to support the notion of “frames of reference” as used in contemporary Bible translation studies. I begin by presenting an overview of “frames” from the perspective of various linguistic and literary scholars as well as a number of experts in the field of communication technology. This leads to my own development of the frames approach through a specification into ten “mini-frames” that may be used in the analysis of biblical (and other) texts. I further elaborate this concept in the area of figurative language by means of the model proposed in mental space theory. My preliminary, more technical discussion is then exemplified with reference to an analysis of John the Baptist’s call to “Behold the Lamb of God!” in John 1:29. Throughout this study, various applications to the theory and practice of Bible translation are made, including its organizational aspects as well as methods of subsequently communicating the translated texts of Scripture today.

1. Introduction—the conceptual framework for this study

Several recently published works on the subject of cognitive “frames” and “framing” (e.g., Bible Translation—Frames of Reference, Scripture Frames and Framing, Contextual Frames of Reference in Translation) have largely presupposed the theoretical validity of these terms when employing the conceptual metaphor of construction to the field of Bible translation. In the rush perhaps to move on to some concrete applications of this all-inclusive mental model, its scholarly legitimacy may have been largely taken for granted. This crucial issue must therefore be addressed: How firm an academic foundation does the common expression “frames of reference” have? In other words, how strongly do current linguistic (semantic) and cognitive studies support the application of frames and framing to the complex communication process of Bible translation, whether in theoretical or practical terms? Some additional conceptual framing, or topical contextualizing, of these key designative representations is needed then to establish and/or reinforce their validity and utility as heuristic tools for the translation trade—that is, for teaching/learning about the subject, or when actually composing and evaluating vernacular translations.

In part one of this study I will overview, mainly by direct quotation, some of the relevant literature from various fields that is presently available, simply to demonstrate that the notion of conceptual frames and framing is well established in the thinking of a significant group of contemporary cognitive-linguists and also a growing number of literary scholars. This information serves as a background for part two and my own limited elaboration of some of these seminal ideas with respect to Bible translation, namely, as a follow-up to works such as those cited above that utilize the “frames of reference” metaphor. This takes

---

1 This is a revised edition of a paper prepared for the Nida Institute for Biblical Scholarship conference on the topic of Translation and Cognition, held June 3–5, 2010, in Spain at the University of Murcia.
2 These are, respectively, Wilt 2003, Wilt and Wendland 2008, Wendland 2008.
3 The expression “frames of reference” derives from the conceptual metaphor PERCEPTION IS CONSTRUCTION—i.e., human perception involves (among other things) composing, prioritizing, and interrelating cognitive mini- and macro-structures with respect to distinct aspects of what we experience, think about, and then attempt to communicate to others via verbal and non-verbal signs (cf. Lakoff 2006). For two recent studies based on the theory of conceptual metaphor as applied to the process of translation and theorizing about translation, see Martin de León (2010) and Monti (2010). I see attention to cognitive and conceptual metaphors as an important key to the future growth of the field of
the form of a somewhat expanded functional methodology that aims to provide some useful insights regarding the task of exegesis and translation, especially in a setting of teaching and learning about translating the Scriptures. In part three, then, I apply certain aspects of this model to a small speech segment of a seemingly simple narrative passage, “Behold the Lamb of God…” (John 1:29) to reveal how a frames approach helps us to conceptualize both the process of textual interpretation, on the one hand, and interlingual communication on the other.

2. Frames and framing in current cognitive linguistic studies

This opening section presents a selection of definitions, examples, and applications from a number of different sources to serve as an introductory survey of the field of frames and framing, suggesting how these important concepts undergird the frames of reference model.

A frame, generally speaking, may be defined as a psychological construct that furnishes one with a prevailing point of view that manipulates prominence and relevance in order to influence thinking and, if need be, subsequent judgment as well. It is a cognitive schema involving a set of interrelated signs (in a semiotic sense) that guides a strategy of perception and interpretation which people rely on to understand and respond to the world around them. They thus mentally project onto their experiences and circumstances the interpretive frames that allow them to make sense of their surroundings (“reality”) in relation to themselves. They then normally shift frames only when some contradiction, conundrum, incongruity, or a change in the context of discourse calls for it. In other words, people only become aware of the frames that they regularly use when some necessity forces them to replace or integrate one frame with another. By inviting others (observers, listeners, readers, etc.) to conceptualize a certain topic from a predetermined point of view, a text “framer” not only supplies an initial orienting mental scenario, but frequently s/he is also able to control their cognitive and emotive alignment as well as their positive or negative response to that particular subject or issue.

In the visual field of a picture, for example, some objects are typically portrayed as being especially important, while others are allowed (or deliberately made) to recede into the background (i.e., so-called figure-ground effect, or Gestalt dynamics). By implying a distinct organization (perspective) for the optical information at hand, such a pictographic frame serves to delineate the imagery and influences how it is to be construed and reacted to. By directing the viewer to consider certain prominent features and to ignore others, this dominant frame thus organizes one’s perception and may itself be resized or reshaped to

4 An early development of frame theory and its application is found in Goffman 1974. The present paragraph is based on information obtained from the definition of “cognitive framing” found at http://world-information.org/trd/06, accessed on December 28, 2009. I am using “frame” to refer to the static conceptual representation, or mental model, that results from an instance of framing, or projection, i.e., the dynamic cognitive activity involved. “Humans posit or identify social and physical 'frames' as they interact with other persons or objects. These ‘frames’ are mental projections that are shaped by a person’s understanding of the world and those things that inhabit or structure it. ‘Frames’ comprise the context within which all forms of interaction take place” (Matthews 2008:166)—including all human perception, interpretation, and communication.

5 Frames are cognitive “clues that tell everyone how to understand what has occurred…a structure of expectation…a body of knowledge that is evoked in order to provide an inferential base for the understanding of an utterance” (Lakoff 2001:24,47).

6 “Many translation theorists are now convinced of the importance of frames and of a gestalt approach to translation…. A good translator reads the text, and in so doing accesses grouped linguistic and textual knowledge. At the text level, translation theorists have assigned this ‘grouped’ knowledge various names, which include ‘text type’ and ‘genre’…. [F]rames are a combination of prior knowledge, generalizations and expectations regarding the text. As the text is read so it is checked against expectations and degrees of fit with other similar known or possible texts. As this process unfolds, a meaningful, but still virtual, text begins to unfold in the mind of the translator…. From the meaningful but wordless text, the translator then sketches a pattern of words in the target language” (Katan 2004:169). This intermediate “virtual text” in the translator’s mind replaces the “transfer” stage of Nida and Taber’s three-stage translation model (1969:33). Simultaneously then, the translator must cognitively mediate and manage (interrelate) the frames of meaning generated by the SL text with the frames of meaning made available in context of culture (including worldview) by the linguistic system of the TL in order to produce a conceptually equivalent text. For a simple illustration of this cognitive process, see Katan (2004:170).
fit within the constraints of some even larger conceptual framework. There is, then, an indispensable connection between semiotic framing and reasoning. When applying problem-solving techniques, as in political negotiations, diverse notional frames may be introduced to influence how a particular issue is perceived; these can in turn lead to radically different solutions, for instance, with respect to the territorial integrity of the nation of Israel and a viable Palestinian homeland.

A dominant framing effect (bias) is normally present also in the terminology of public and private media. News broadcasts, for example, may try to follow the rules for objective reporting and yet inadvertently (or deliberately, in countries with a muzzled press) convey a particularly framed presentation of events that prevents some (perhaps a majority) of the audience/readers from making a balanced assessment of the persons, activities, or situations being reported on, e.g., concerning the notion of free elections in nations as diverse as Afghanistan and Zimbabwe. Similarly, political as well as public-relations (PR) firms typically use carefully chosen terminology to help frame a given issue, structuring the prevailing discussion and shaping the substantive questions which then subsequently emerge, e.g., maintaining economic superiority versus preserving energy independence in relation to the sensitive subject of offshore drilling for oil. Such bridging language employs a strategy of responding to issues with specific words or concepts that shift the discourse from taboo or controversial topics to more acceptable ones, e.g., concerning one’s sexual orientation as it affects his/her qualifications for a particular public position, elected office, or civic role. Frames thus perform the necessary function of directing, even limiting, debate by putting into verbal play selected key terms, examples, comparisons, and conceptual metaphors through which participants can comprehend and discuss an issue—global warming and carbon footprints, for example, in relation to the GNP and what constitutes a developing nation, as opposed to a developed (industrialized) nation, with respect to their attributed responsibilities for dealing with the world’s acknowledged environmental problems.

The prominent cognitive linguist George Lakoff gives the following elementary illustration of framing, along with several derived principles that it illustrates:7 During a conversation, if someone suddenly tells you, “Don’t think of an elephant!”—you will discover that the command is impossible to carry out. Why? Because in order to deliberately not think of an elephant, you will automatically have to think of one. This demonstrates some important things about lexical-semantic frames, the simplest types that form the basis for the more complex and inclusive frames mentioned above.

In the first place, every visualizable word in a language (in English, a noun or a verb, and sometimes even a qualifier) evokes a certain frame—a conceptual structure used in all thought and discourse. The word elephant, for example, evokes the familiar image of an elephant plus a variable number of features associated with this large mammal, depending on the verbal and non-verbal context (e.g., large floppy ears, a long trunk-like nose/hand, four stout stumpy legs, a dull grayish color, etc.). Depending on one’s experience, other sensory impressions may be evoked as well, especially those based on sound or smell (e.g., a circus elephant). As already indicated, negating a specific frame also serves to elicit it. Related words used within an active conceptual frame and a particular setting of discourse further develop that frame and generate associated implications. For example, the sentence, “Dumbo was a circus star” continues the elephant frame and richly expands it by evoking (for those who remember!) the classic Walt Disney animated movie by the name of Dumbo. Finally, reiterating a given frame reinforces it upon one’s perception and memory, thus helping to prevent possible cases of ambiguity or unclarity of reference. For example, if somewhat later in a conversation about the 1941 film someone said, “His ears saved the day and Walt Disney too,” informed listeners would apply the combined elephant-Dumbo frame to the fact that the pachyderm’s enormous ears enabled him to fly, making him a hero, while the popular movie helped Disney studios to survive a severe wartime financial downturn.

In the following quotation,8 Lakoff applies the notion of frames and framing to the political scene to illustrate how it explains some of our fundamental thought processes and deeply felt ideals, which are then

---

7 This paragraph is based on George Lakoff’s, “An Introduction to Framing and Its Uses in Politics” (2006) at www.cognitivepolicyworks.com/resource-center/frame-analysis-framing-tutorials/simple-framing/.
8 From “Frames and Framing” (2007), on the website of the Rockridge Institute at www.rockridgeinstitute.org/aboutus/frames-and-framing/. This quote is used for illustrative purposes only; the political views expressed are not at issue. For another illustration of framing in political discourse, see Macgilchrist 2007.
Expressing progressive political ideas and values effectively begins with understanding frames. Frames are the mental structures that allow human beings to understand reality—and sometimes to create what we take to be reality. Contemporary research on the brain and the mind has shown that most thought—most of what the brain does—is below the level of consciousness, and these unconscious thoughts frame conscious thought in ways that are not obvious. These mental structures, or frames, appear in and operate through the words we use to discuss the world around us, including politics. Frames simultaneously shape our thinking and language at multiple levels—the level of moral values, the level of political principles, the level of issue areas (e.g., the environment), the level of a single issue (e.g., the climate crisis), and the level of specific policy (e.g., cap-and-auction). Successful political arguments depend as much on a well-articulated moral frame as they do on policy details—often more. The most effective political messages are those that clearly and coherently link an issue area, single issue, or specific policy to fundamental moral values and political principle frames.

Frames matter. Our fundamental moral frame, our worldview, determines how we experience and think about every aspect of our lives, from child rearing to healthcare, from public transportation to national security, from religion to love of country. Yet, people are typically unconscious of how their fundamental moral frames shape their political positions. [We all must together] work to make that thinking more explicit in order to improve political debate.

The preceding discussion helps to introduce and orient us to a helpful theoretical perspective for the frames of reference model, namely, the cognitive linguistic approach of frame semantics, which was developed in the 1980s by Charles Fillmore. Fillmore defines the key term frame as, “any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits.…a system of categories structured in accordance with some motivating context” (2006:371,381). The motivating context, in turn, refers to, “some body of understandings, some pattern of practices, or some history of social institutions, against which we find intelligible the creation of a particular category in the history of the language community” (2006:381).

Thus, one cannot fully comprehend the meaning of a single word (a lexical sign) without access to all the essential background knowledge that relates to that word. For example, one would not understand the word “buy” (in English or its equivalent in another language) without knowing anything about the general situation of the commercial transaction in mind, which also involves, in addition to a buyer, a seller, something offered for sale, the value of the goods, money, the setting, the particular interpersonal and sociocultural relationships that link the buyer and the seller, and so forth. A certain perspective, or focus, is also adopted; in the case of the word “buy,” it would be that of the buyer, not the seller. Frames are thus based on learned information as well as recurring informal experiences in life, which store in one’s memory bank a commercial-transaction frame that would be evoked by the word buy in an appropriate context. Frame semantic research seeks to discover and delineate the various reasons that a speech community has for creating the conceptual category (sense) represented (or indexed) by a given word in each of the different cultural settings in which it is used, or not used. Such usage is viewed as part of the word’s overall meaning. From the preceding discussion, it is obvious that frame theory does not attempt to distinguish between referential, or denotative, meaning and encyclopedic meaning, as was done in the old componential semantic approach. Furthermore, because it is a pragmatically-oriented cognitive model of meaning and communication, frame theory clearly indicates why translation—of any type—is ultimately impossible, that is, if complete conceptual and emotive (semantic and pragmatic) equivalence (or cognitive parity) is the envisioned goal.

9 Cognitive framing is thus an active perceptual (constitutive) and a conceptual (compositional) cognitive strategy for interpreting and representing the world of reality and experience to others (and to oneself) via verbal texts as well as other semiotic signal systems.

10 “One should not assign to the semantic structure of the lexicon all the culturally relevant encyclopedic information existing in the culture, but include in the meaning only those components marked by lexical and distribution contrasts” (Nida 1975:137).
Some additional developments of the basic frame model in conceptual linguistic studies emerge in the examples given in the following citation (Petruk 1996:3):

A number of important concepts figure into the Frame Semantics approach to linguistic description and analysis. One such concept is that of a prototype, understood as a fairly large slice of the surrounding culture against which the meaning of a word is defined and understood. For example, to understand the meaning of the word “breakfast,” it is necessary to understand the institutions and practices of the culture in which the category exists. In this case, it is necessary to understand the practice of eating three meals a day at more or less fixed times and that the meal eaten in the early part of the day after a period of sleep has a special menu; for this meal we use the word “breakfast.” The conditions which define the prototype need not all be present in order for native speakers to use the word appropriately….  

Much of the Frame Semantics literature covers frames and individual words (or sets of words) and expressions. In addition to its utility in lexical semantics, the frame is also considered a useful tool in text semantics and the semantics of grammar. The interpreter of a text invokes a frame when assigning an interpretation to a piece of text by placing its contents in a pattern known independently of the text. A text evokes a frame when a linguistic form or pattern is conventionally associated with that particular frame. For example, consider the sentence “Julia will open her presents after blowing out the candles and eating some cake.” Although there is no mention of a birthday party, interpreters sharing the requisite cultural background invoke a birthday party scene.

The following illustrative discussion further grounds the frame semantic approach within the general field of cognitive linguistics (Shead 2007:45,47, original emphasis):

The heart of a frame-based approach to semantics, then, is relationships between concepts—particularly that between a profile and its base. The profile is “the concept symbolized by the word in question,” and its base is “that knowledge or conceptual structure that is presupposed by the profiled concept” (Croft and Cruse 2004:15). For example, HYPOTENUSE is based on, or presupposes, the RIGHT-ANGLED TRIANGLE frame, with its conception of three sides spatially coordinated in a particular way. Similarly, to understand the concept RADIUS (and hence the word radius) requires prior knowledge of the CIRCLE concept. In fact, both hypotenuse and radius profile nothing more than a straight line; the difference lies in the bases against which they are profiled.…. Croft defines “frame” in terms of this profile—base relationship: a frame is “A SEMANTIC STRUCTURE THAT FUNCTIONS AS THE BASE FOR AT LEAST ONE CONCEPT PROFILE (typically, many profiles)” (Croft and Cruse 2004:15, emphasis original). These two conceptual entities—a profile and its frame—are simultaneously evoked, for either the addressee or the addressee, when a word is used.

David Katan (2004:51–52) then adds the notion of hierarchy and inclusion to the basic frames model.  

---

11 Ellen van Wolde has recently (2009) developed the notion of frames and broader scripts or prototypical scenarios in order to present an integrated cognitive approach to biblical studies and studies of the written and material culture of the ancient Near East (Reframing Biblical Studies—note pp. 59–60). Similarly, Robbins has applied frame and prototype criticism with reference to his detailed investigation of “[early] Christian discourse,” based on the following general and specific assumptions: “[A] its foundations human cognition is metaphorical [and/or metonymic, i.e., analogical and/or associative]. Humans continually use reasoning in one domain to sort through cognitive items in another domain. This means that throughout the millennia humans have continually used forms, which cognitive scientists call ‘frames,’ in one conceptual domain to understand and interpret forms in another domain…. [T]he six early Christian rhetoricians investigated and interpreted in this volume [i.e., wisdom, prophetic, apocalyptic, precreation, priestly, miracle]…are cultural-religious frames that introduce multiple networks of thinking, reasoning, and acting that were alive and dynamic in early Christian thought, language, and practice” (2009:99–100,118).

12 For example, in a recent study Bosman demonstrates “that love and affection between humans or humans and God in the HB [Hebrew Bible] are structured and presented in different frames, namely, the Kinship, Romance, Friendship, Political, Adultery, Human-God, Idolatry, Conduct, Inanimate Object and Wisdom Frames…. 278C can only be understood properly if the conceptual frames in which it occurs are considered. These frames contain all the background information that is needed to understand [and translate] a word within its specific context and time” (Bosman 2010:112–113,121–122, original emphasis).

13 Thus every conceptual frame that is evoked in a particular textual context and sociocultural setting is normally included within, and/or associated with contextually related frames to which certain emotions and attitudes may be attached, along with a specific point of focus or emphasis. Katan divides his insightful book into four major sections (2004:1, emphasis added): 1) “Framing cultures: The culture-bound mental map of the world,” 2) “Shifting frames: Translation and mediation in theory and practice,” 3) “The array of frames: Communication orientations,” and 4)
To summarize, every message contains another message: the meta-message. The meta-message is located at a higher level and frames the message, and hence houses connotations. The frame itself is an internal mental representation, which can also contain an idealized example or prototype of what we should expect. Many of these frames together make up our map of the world.

The concept of frames and the process of framing has even been turned into a media-based, public-issue centered business by the web-based company known as Frame Works, which has developed the patented procedure of “Strategic Frame Analysis” to carry out their various analyses, assessments, and advice on behalf of paid clients. Their professional methodology is described in part below to more fully illustrate how cognitive frames/framing operate in actual practice during the process of persuasive human communication (i.e., rhetorically—in a certain strategic direction, to accomplish a particular goal).14

**The FrameWorks Perspective: Strategic Frame Analysis™**

Put simply, framing refers to the construct of a communication—its language, visuals and messengers—and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information. *By framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Frames trigger meaning….*

This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames most likely to stimulate public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). We use the term *reframe* to mean *changing “the context of the message exchange”* so that different interpretations and probable outcomes become visible to the public (Dearing and Rogers 1994:98). Strategic frame analysis™ offers policy advocates a way to work systematically through the challenges that are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies, to anticipate attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome public misunderstanding…. In his seminal book, *Public Opinion* (1921:16), Walter Lippmann was perhaps the first to connect mass communications to public attitudes and policy preferences by recognizing that the “the way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.” The modern extension of Lippmann’s observation is based on the concept of “frames.”

*People use mental shortcuts to make sense of the world. Since most people are looking to process incoming information quickly and efficiently, they rely upon cues within that new information to signal to them how to connect it with their stored images of the world. The “pictures in our heads,” as Lippmann called them, might better be thought of as *vividly labeled storage boxes*—filled with pictures, images, and stories from our past encounters with the world and labeled youth, marriage, poverty, fairness, etc. The incoming information provides cues about which is the right container for that idea or experience. The efficient thinker makes the connection, a process called “indexing,” and moves on.*

Put another way, *how an issue is framed is a trigger to these shared and durable cultural models that help us make sense of our world.* When a frame ignites a cultural model, or calls it into play in the interpretation, the whole model is operative. This allows people to reason about an issue, to make inferences, to fill in the blanks for missing information by referring to the robustness of the model, not the sketchy frame.

As Lippmann observed, “We define first, and then see.” *The cognitive cultural models that are sparked by the frame allow us to forget certain information and to invent other details, because the frame is now in effect.*15

Several recent books by prominent cognitive linguists and literary critics have also promoted and popularized the concept of frames and framing as a vital aspect of human perception, reasoning, and communication via various modes and media of transmission. A few sample citations follow (emphasis added):

---

14 From the FrameWorks Institute website at [http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/perspective.html](http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/perspective.html), emphasis added.

15 The elements that typically serve to signal meaning in news reports, for example, include familiar metaphors, personages, anecdotes, historical events, visuals (photos, pictures, graphs, charts, etc.), and key terms (both words and phrases).
Contextual *frame* theory was developed in order to understand how readers track references to characters and events through the process of reading. The basic notion involves the idea of a contextual frame, a mental representation of the circumstances containing the current context. This is built up from the text itself as well as from inferences drawn directly from the text... A reader must thus keep track of which information applies in any particular context, and this knowledge is arranged in terms of contextual *frames*. These are not simply ‘snapshots’ of successive moments across the narrative, however, but are a series of ongoing and shifting mental representations of the world of the literary work.... Though readers need to hold several contextual *frames* in mind, the current point of reading forms the main *frame* in focus.... As the narrative moves on, different contexts move into the primary focus: the current frame that is being monitored is said to be primed. Characters, objects and the location of the main context currently being monitored are all bound to that *frame* and primed too. When the reader’s attention is taken elsewhere, that *frame* and all its contents become unprimed (Stockwell 2002:155–156).

Placing nonfocal information in [the] clause-initial position has the effect of establishing an explicit frame of reference for the clause that follows. It does not result in emphasis. By definition, emphasis refers to taking what was already most important in a clause and placing it in [syntactic position two] at the beginning of the clause. Frames of reference are used to highlight the introduction of a new topic or center of interest in the discourse. They are also used to attract attention to a discontinuity in the discourse in order to help the reader/hearer properly process it. Contrast is not created by the use of frames of reference, though it may increase it (Runge 2010:224–225).

De Pizan’s analogies can be taken as blends with narrative *frames* attached. *Frames* such as analogies like these surface from time to time in the text to help us make sense of it, just as they must have helped de Pizan’s readers make sense of it so many years ago. The cognitive narratologist Manfred Jahn has identified *frames* to “denote the cognitive model that is selected and used (and sometimes discarded) in the process of reading a narrative text”.... As remembered *frameworks* engaged to interpret new situations..., these models might be in constant use when we read. The Sicambrians, for example, are defined for us in the text as the French (163). By knowing who the French are we use a known *frame* (the “French”) to understand the unknown group (the Sicambrians).... “how readers and listeners process a narrative... depends on the nature and scope of the world knowledge to which it is indexed”.... In extremely subtle ways, our “French” *frame* would be indexed to the Sicambrians, and we would then continue reading unproblematically after coming across the previously unknown entity (Semino and Culpepper 2002:12–13).

To this point, our taxonomies of integration networks have emphasized the role of *frames*. Simplex, mirror, single scope, and double scope networks were all defined, as main types, by the relations of the organizing *frames* of the inputs and their relation to the *frames* in the generic space and the blended space. But identity and character are an equally important aspect of the way we think. We can think of *frames* as transporting across different characters (the buy-sell *frame* stays the same regardless of who is buying and selling), or we can think of character as transporting across different *frames*: Odysseus remains who he is regardless of his situation (Fauconnier and Turner 2002:251).

Metaphor allows the mind to use a few basic ideas—substance, location, force, goal—to understand more abstract domains. Combinatorics allows a finite set of simple ideas to give rise to an infinite set of complex ones. Another fallout of the metaphor metaphor is the phenomenon of *framing*. Many disagreements in human affairs turn not on differences in data or logic but on how a problem is *framed*. We see this when adversaries “talk past each other” or when understanding something requires a “paradigm shift”.... But isn’t it undeniable that beliefs and decisions are affected by how the facts are *framed*? Yes, but that is not necessarily irrational. Different ways of framing a situation may be equally consistent with the facts being described in that very sentence, but they make different commitments about other facts which are not being described. As such, rival framings can be examined and evaluated, not just spread by allure or imposed by force (Pinker 2007:243,260–261, original emphasis).

So what are some of the main implications of a frame semantic approach for Bible translation? Virtually all types of translation-related activity can be conceptualized, discussed, taught, practiced, and assessed in...
terms of the notion of framing (the active cognitive means of organizing experience) and frames (the stative cognitive result in terms of knowledge structures), with various modifications, as needed, for example:

- **Re-framing**: composing a TL text with careful reference to the semantic sense and pragmatic significance of the biblical SL original (the various components of a text, from its sounds to levels of discourse structure), thus generating different, but hopefully sufficiently similar conceptual (including any emotive-attitudinal connotative) frames in the TL, depending on the specific language, culture, and project job description (brief and Skopos).

- **De-framing**: either rendering the biblical text periphrastically and favoring the perspective of the cognitive-emotive frames of the TL language-culture (i.e., “domestication”)—or—adopting an overly literal approach, linguistically unnatural in the TL, such that the intended audience cannot (fully) understand, or misunderstands, the intended sense of the SL text (i.e., foreignization).

- **Hyper-framing**: enriching or correcting the conceptual framework of the TL readership through various paratextual means, e.g., footnotes, introductions, illustrations, cross-references, glossary entries, etc., so that it more closely matches the cognitive frames that (most scholars agree) were most likely evoked for hearers of the biblical SL text.

- **Co-framing**: complementing the prevalent linguistic (including lexical) and literary uses of frames/framing, as highlighted above, by means of other, socioculturally-oriented applications, such as those described in Wilt and Wendland 2008—for example, the organizational, communicational, and intertextual frames of reference (chapters 4–6).

Thus, starting out with a primary SL text orientation, translators aim to construe its intended meaning, in the fullest sense. By correctly framing the biblical document within its situational setting according to the inferential principle of relevance (weighing mental processing cost in relation to conceptual gain, Gutt 1992:24–25; cf. Pattemore 2007:259), they create a suitable cognitive context for understanding its primary explicit and implicit meaning. Various discourse analysis procedures are also applied with reference to the original text to carry out the progressive and interactive (implied author-audience) process of interpretation. Moving then to a TL text orientation, translators aim to re-constitute the essential sense and significance of the Scripture at hand through construction of equivalent frames within the overall cognitive environment (Gutt 1992:22) of the local language and culture. These translation-based frames normally need to be supplemented, augmented, modified, corrected, etc., through the use of paratextual resources. This provides an adequate (necessary and sufficient) conceptual background for the target audience to interpret and relate the biblical message accurately within their own sociocultural context and primary setting of use.

Finally, I must call attention to a much more sophisticated and extensive application of the notion of frames and framing that has been recently applied to Bible translation by Richard Hoyle under the term “scenario theory.” The following quotes from Hoyle (2008) orient readers with regard to this perceptive and productive approach. Here they are re-paragraphed and slightly edited, but Hoyle’s work is well worth studying in its entirety:

Minsky (1975), calling scenarios “frames”, defines them as mental structures representing stereotyped situations, by which we understand new situations, and which we constantly update in the light of experience. Stereotypical elements function as “defaults” within these frames unless contradicted. Since understanding and interpretation is based on comparison between the “remembered framework” and the actual situation, it is vital in communication that the audience access the appropriate “frame.” However,...experience, and thus “remembered frameworks” are affected by culture. So translations, which normally involve transfer of meaning not just across language but also across culture, will be interpreted in the light of different frames from those of the original author and audience. This means that a translation must do more than duplicate words, it must duplicate the situational frames those words originally referred to. Minsky acknowledges that people’s mental frames can be modified in the light of new experience. This means that translated Scriptures can modify people’s scenarios, e.g., connecting God with love and forgiveness. (p.7)
Sanford and Garrod...also stress the contractual nature of communication: The basis on which discourse is produced is essentially contractual. A writer wishes to convey an idea to his readers. In essence, this means that he must establish in the mind of his reader a situational model which is the same (or closely similar to) the one in his own mind. He can then refer to this model as his discourse unfolds and be reasonably certain that what he says will be intelligible. Their work is important for translation, because they show not only that texts are understood by the reader’s interlinking the text with existing mental scenarios, but also that the writer has the responsibility to make the appropriate scenario clear to the reader. The implicit/explicit issue then, concerns not simply translation, but communication. Translators, as communicators to a new target audience, must reevaluate the level of implicit information in accordance with their new audience’s mental scenarios, so that essential links missing in the hearers’ scenarios are supplied explicitly in the text. (9–10)

Although [Sperber and Wilson] speak of “cognitive environment”, which also includes the real life situation at the time of communication, the “memorized information,” which makes up the bulk of an individual’s “cognitive environment” and which facilitates perception and inference, is of course the organized body of information categorized and stored in the individual’s mental scenarios. For [Sperber and Wilson], the communicator’s role is to express the message in the most “relevant” way, in the light of assumptions about the audience’s cognitive environment. This includes communicating in the most efficient way, omitting what can be easily inferred, but making explicit anything whose omission would make the text harder to process. If translation is to be “relevant” it must communicate in this same manner, saying neither too much nor too little to efficiently communicate the author’s intended message. Thus in translation, the decision whether to make part of the message explicit should not be decided simply by what was explicit in the source language text, but rather be based on whether the target audience, in the light of their preexisting mental scenarios, will understand the original message easily and accurately. (10)

Communication relies on the communicator and audience having similar mental scenarios. These shared scenarios are the “given” in communication, on the basis of which the communicator chooses how explicit or implicit to be, so that the audience is able to accurately guess the fuller picture of what the communicator is trying to say, by “filling in” what is left unsaid from their existing knowledge stored in their mental scenarios. However, these scenarios are not universally the same, but are culture- and language-specific. So to understand any text, we must not rely on our own mental scenarios, but identify the mental scenarios in the mind of the original author. Thus knowledge of New Testament Greek scenarios is vital for exegesis of the New Testament texts. Similarly, to translate, we must also know the mental scenarios of the new target audience, since our message must be framed in such a way that they can accurately fill in what the author intended as implicit information, rather than make incorrect assumptions on the basis of their own cultural presuppositions. But how can we possibly know what other people’s scenarios are? Fortunately, there are lexical and grammatical clues. Because concepts are grouped mentally in scenarios, the grouping of vocabulary in a text indicates which concepts were grouped in the writer’s mind. Also, as Schank and Abelson...point out with respect to scripts, the presence of scenarios may be linked to certain grammatical markers such as the definite article. (15)

It is important to reiterate in this discussion that in the effort to re-frame the resident (indigenous) mental scenarios of the TL audience so they more closely approximate those of the biblical author and his original audience, translators today must make use of the translated text as well as the various features of its supplementary paratext—typography, format, illustrations, section headings, footnotes, etc. In addition, the implicit connotative-emotive values, including rhetorical impact and aesthetic appeal, originally attached to these interrelated generic and specific scenarios also need to be factored into the analytical process. The implications for Bible translation of the preceding theoretical and illustrative data regarding frames and framing should be quite clear, at least in a general way. In the next two sections, I will attempt to make the application somewhat more concrete and hopefully also user-friendly in terms of teaching and learning this approach as an aid in the challenging task of re-presenting (or re-framing) a passage of Scripture in a designated target language and cultural setting.
3. Developing the frames of reference model

In Contextual Frames of Reference in Translation (2008), I treat the subject in terms of a set of interrelated conceptual macro-constructs, moving (hypothetically) from the most general, i.e., cognitive (worldview) frames, down through sociocultural, organizational, conversational, intertextual, and textual—to the most specific, utterance and lexical frames. This over-simplified (i.e., for teaching purposes), top-down perspective and approach could, of course, be reversed. In any case, it is important to point out the provisional character of these posited categories and their assumed interaction in the construction of meaning. Thus, in the workbook referred to above, which seeks to apply basic frames theory and methodology to the practice of Bible translation, the approach is presented in a manner that might be deemed rather too static and rigid.

In reality, however, conceptual frames manifest fuzzy and fluid boundaries that relate to one another in manifold ways (e.g., salience, relevance, appropriateness) during perception and cognition, depending on the prevailing interpersonal social setting and physical or environmental circumstances. They are dynamic, fluctuating mental constructs that are readily modified or adapted during any given communication process—formal or informal, oral or written, public or private, etc.—under the influence of a host of factors. These factors vary according to who is speaking to whom and how, when, where, or why. Such modification may occur more or less automatically by intuition or as part of an active communicative strategy of negotiation, whereby one party seeks to persuasively present (or impose) his/her point of view to (upon) another to accomplish certain pragmatic objectives.

The following schematic diagram adds a visual dimension (for didactic purposes) to depict the flexible process of framing. It serves to summarize ten common generic cognitive notions that may be evoked lexically in variable, interconnected sets during the production and interpretation of any literary (including biblical) discourse. They (among other possibilities) are viewed as being components (mini-frames) of the textual macro-frame, which functions as one of the more general contextualizing constructs noted above. Together, in changeable, kaleidoscopic fashion according to one’s current interest and concerns, they provide the overall conceptual framework that may be associated with, or evoked by, a given text when

The qualifier “contextual” is deliberate: The frames of reference model essentially involves a hypercontextualized approach to translation. In other words, it offers a heuristic method for investigating interrelated contexts. These diverse contexts inform and/or influence the interlingual interpretation and transmission of meaning. All of this occurs during the multifaceted process of communicating an original source language text to a clearly-defined audience group in a given consumer language and sociocultural setting.

A person/people’s worldview is itself a very complex construct, or cognitive framework. It may be factored into an integrated set of basic assumptions and values pertaining to macro-issues such as origin, reality, identity, meaning, morality, spirituality, destiny, and truth—or, more dynamically, into a number of interacting, mutually influencing variables, depending on the culture concerned, e.g., causality, classification, time, space, self-others, and relationship (van Steenbergen 2007:38). A worldview, or macro—“cognitive environment,” naturally influences—in some respects even pre-determines—a people’s way of life and value system. These features must be carefully analyzed by translators in a comparative manner with respect to both the source (biblical) and also the target cultures in order to “bring out clearly where the differences between the cultures are at a conceptual level. The analysis will then show which encyclopedic information is relevant for the reader in order to have access to the full semantic contents of the text” (van Steenbergen 2007:39).

On the macro-structure of cognition, cognitive frames (sociocultural, conversational, textual, etc.) are interrelated by analogy (metaphor) and/or association (metonymy). Each incorporated micro-structural frame then is comprised of a generic > specific set of conceptual collocates, normally including a prototypical instance (the sign [ ] signifies “encompasses”). Frames as well as collocates are organized in relation to one another according to a governing perspective (focus) and the prioritizing principle of relevance within the current cultural setting of use and genre of verbal discourse. Katan proposes a hierarchy of macroframes “that all biological or social systems operate within,” namely: Identity/Role > Values/Beliefs > Capabilities/Strategies > Behavior(s) > Environment (2004:53).

Robert Bascom points out that “[o]nce frames (or roles…) are seen as dynamic processes within the larger context of human interaction, all frame typologies and their interrelations (e.g., Wendland 2008:6) can be seen as the description of particular examples, or possible frozen moments in time. Which frame will encompass the other cannot be determined beforehand in more than a general or superficial way” (2010:51). However, as Mona Baker has observed in this connection: “The idea, then, is not to throw lists of apparently static components out altogether but to use them merely as starting points for analysis, to acknowledge that they are not all necessarily relevant in every context and, more importantly, that every element is open to negotiation in the course of a given interaction” (2006:328).
The summary designations applied to the basic frames depicted in the preceding diagram are briefly defined below; these cognitive constructs are then further described and illustrated with reference to conceptualizing and translating the passage John 1:29. From an interpreter’s perspective, these distinct but overlapping and interactive frames, or schemata, are evoked and construed on the basis of textual signs (phonological/graphological, lexical, syntactic) within the discourse at hand and in relation to a given situational context.

---

21 As noted in Scripture Frames and Framing (Wilt and Wendland, ch.1), cognitive frames not only influence perception and provide focus and perspective, but they are also conceptually malleable (they may be expanded or reshaped) and interactive with other frames in a given communication setting (e.g., through embedding, overlapping and juxtaposing). “The transitory and ever-shifting nature of the frame, therefore, requires a continuous cognitive process that encompasses reevaluation of the makeup of the frame situation in which the observer views these occurrences” (Matthews 2008:76).

22 Another proposed grid for classifying the various metonymic relationships between mental spaces, or more specifically, the “conceptual relations that connect elements in mental spaces” is found in Fauconnier and Turner (2006:336–337): Change, identity, time, space, cause-effect, representation, part-whole, role-value, analogy, disanalogy, property, similarity, category, intentionality, uniqueness.

23 Robert Koops makes this comment on such frames (2000:3, italics added): “Another class of mapping is ‘schema mapping’ which has been developed extensively by Ronald Langacker. A general schema, frame, or model is used to structure a situation in context. Such schemas are activated by certain grammatical constructions and vocabulary. When a sentence like ‘Sally bought a cake for five dollars’ is created, a ‘frame’ (idealized cognitive model, or prototypical human experience) is accessed, and the participants in the textual narrative are mapped onto the roles that are characteristic of the cognitive model. Other writers have used words like ‘script,’ and ‘scenario,’ to describe similar phenomena.” I would just add that the conceptual activation process for such interpretive frames undoubtedly involves the situational context of the extralinguistic communicative event as well as the verbal text. One’s perception and comprehension would also be guided by relevance principles—i.e., activating the particular frame and cognitive constituents which: (a) furnish important contextual information (assumptions) that the subject does not know; (b) guide her/him to source-intended implications; (c) eliminate extraneous or erroneous assumptions; (d) reinforce correct and necessary assumptions; and (e) do not result in too much cognitive processing effort (thus outweighing the derived gain in contextual effects; cf. Gutt 1992).
cotext and context. They are then intuitively combined and prioritized according to the principle of perceived salience (or relevance) to form an interpretive mental framework for deriving the overall intended meaning from the verbal passage currently being examined (e.g., John 1:29). Each mental frame, or perceptual window on the world of the text in its situational setting, attaches various associated ideas, connotations, collocations, emotions, values, etc. to the overall cognitive construct. These frame-fillers are normally very specific in terms of culture, society, area, group, and even individual experience. This creates a complex hierarchy of concepts as well as a progression from lesser to more particular notions, which thus constitutes an overall communication setting that is rather difficult for others (who come from an alien sociocultural framework) to perceive and analyze correctly. For example, in a narrative text, typically:

1. One **time** frame is added to the next, normally in chronological sequence, but occasionally flashbacks or flash-forwards are employed to achieve a particular dramatic purpose.

2. One **place** frame (scene) leads to the next, though within the same spatial setting minor moves may be significant in the account. A shift in time as well as place frame normally signals a major break—a new scene in a dramatic performance or episode in a narrative account.

3. One **substantive** frame (person, object, entity) may be related either to another substantive by means of a genitival attributive relationship (e.g., kinship, descriptive, subjective) and/or to an event by a system of cases, or role relationships (e.g., agent, object, patient, experiencer).

4. One **event** frame (finite verb) is added to the next to form the backbone of the narrative. Additional event frames are related to this mainline in subsidiary fashion through various backgrounding devices, e.g., non-finite verb forms, dependent clauses (including negatives and conditionals), nominalized event words.

5. One or more frames that pertain to **quality** (attribute, characteristic, feature, property, etc., including any propositional state) may be related to a particular entity (e.g., person, object).

6. One **social** frame (involving one or more persons or a group) is related to another by means of ethnic, cultural (e.g., age-group), class-based, organizational, economic, religious, or some other similarity and/or distinction (e.g., Pharisees, Saducees, Zealots in first century CE Palestine).

7. One **logical** frame (normally a proposition or kernel clause) is related to another by some manner of cause-effect linkage, e.g., means-purpose, cause-effect, condition-consequence, exhortation-grounds, etc. associated relationships, e.g., part-whole, reason-result.

8. One **speech-act** (SA), or a closely conjoined cluster of them (a speech event or text act), is related to another by various means, e.g., simple addition, elaboration, contradiction, affirmation, embedding, etc.

9. One **prior text** (pre-text) is related to another, the current text, by means of varying degrees of verbal similarity (citation, allusion, echo); the oral or written pre-text may exist within the same text (intratextuality) or external to it (intertextuality).

10. One **genre** or sub-type of discourse, along with the structural, stylistic, and sociolinguistic features associated with it in a given speech community and literary/oral tradition, may be included in, followed by, or combined (merged) with another major or minor genre within the current text unit.

---

24 This description of the dynamic interaction of frames during cognition and communication parallels that developed in the radial network model of prototype theory, where the semantic structure of cognitive categories which are evoked by a given oral or written text “takes the form of a radial set of clustered and overlapping meanings” (Geeraerts 2006:146). These radiate out in a flexible network construction from the focal, or central, category, as established by the verbal cotext and extralinguistic, sociocultural context.

25 “The choice of metaphor we use (which is cultural) determines our understanding. Other cultures use other metaphors and develop other cognitive schema to understand illness”—for example: Faithfulness TASTES good, so don’t let AIDS EAT you! (Nepalese) versus Faithfulness will DEFEAT AIDS in the BATTLE for life! (English/Western cultural setting) (Beine 2009:3,6).
There are probably a number of other important frame categories that need to be considered during the analysis of a given discourse, but the preceding are some of the most common and helpful for use when analyzing biblical texts and re-textualizing them in another linguistic and cultural framework. While exploring any one of the preceding ten types, other relevant frames may come to mind, which can then be evaluated and integrated with reference to those already identified in the context of a specific passage.

4. Summary—Some principles of applied framing in hermeneutics:

- The complex corpus and integrated system of conceptual frames that are characteristic of an individual, community, society, or nation are always informed and influenced by her/his/their governing sociocultural framework (cognitive environment: worldview, belief system, set of values, social institutions, history, oral/written traditions, etc.).

- Any given concept in a language, as triggered by a specific lexical item (word or phrase), operates together with grammatically related distinctions to evoke a prioritized set of basic cognitive frames that sociologically contextualize it to a greater or lesser degree. To use a window analogy: one (comparatively larger or smaller) window of the brain/screen opens within, or alongside, another to expand the cognitive horizon both paradigmatically (i.e. vertically through the process of analogy/metaphor) and syntagmatically (horizontally by means of association/juxtaposition/metonymy).

- Communication always involves a hypertext of interconnected cognitive frames (mental windows, or tabs on the toolbar of the mind) that are evoked by a particular text. These are sorted, arranged, organized, evaluated, prioritized, etc. according to the principle of relevance, managing processing effort in relation to cognitive effects (Gutt 1992:74–75)—i.e., addition to, subtraction from, reinforcement or modification of a current or active, resident frame of reference.

---

26 These generic frames (schemata) are evoked, or expanded upon, by those that occur on the microlevel of conceptual organization, i.e., temporal, spatial, hypothetical, contrafactual, metaphorical, etc. “Cognitive Linguistics [CL] attempts to display what is actually happening in our brains when linguistic expressions are used. CL claims that linguistic expressions do not correspond directly to objects and events in the real world, but rather trigger complex mental configurations, which ‘map’ in various ways and are interlinked like telephone networks… One job of cognitive construction is to partition information into domains and ‘mental spaces’…. As discourse proceeds, the configuration of participants in a space may be changed by the addition of new elements (often marked by an indefinite article). New spaces are set up relative to (and dependent upon) the previous ones. At any point there will be a ‘base’ space and a ‘focus’ space. The function of tense, aspect and modal markers is to indicate which of several windows the speaker is ‘in’…. A point cognitivists stress is that the text itself gives us a bare minimum of signals. These interact with stored frames and schemas to produce elaborate configurations of interlinked images” (Koops 2000:1–3). For an excellent overview of cognitive linguistics and its implications for exegesis, dictionary making, and biblical studies generally, see the study of van Wolde (2009), whose subtitle well summarizes both the hermeneutical and also the communicational challenge that we face: “When language and text meet culture, cognition, and context.” A further challenge is to find a way to effectively present the manifold insights of cognitive linguistics in a form that is pedagogically accessible to ordinary Bible translators.

27 In the terminology of frame semantics: “[W]e have here not just a group of individual words, but a ‘domain’ of vocabulary whose elements somehow presuppose a schematization of human judgment and behavior involving notions of worth, responsibility, judgment, etc., such that one would want to say that nobody can really understand the meaning of the words in that domain who does not understand the social institutions or the structures of experience which they presuppose…. [W]e can see that the process of understanding a text involves retrieving or perceiving the frames evoked by the text’s lexical content and assembling this kind of schematic knowledge (in some way which cannot be easily formalized [but note the schemata employed by mental space theorists—e.g., Fauconnier and Turner 2006]) into some sort of ‘envisionment’ of the ‘world’ of the text” (Fillmore 2006:378, 383). For a summary of a comprehensive and systematic cognitive method of analysis, see van Wolde 2009:204–205.

28 Like the Microsoft Windows program, one window (frame) opens within and over/under/aside another, depending on the point of reference (like any graphic enhancement), as determined by relevance to the viewer. Would the image of computer windows be a more effective metaphor than frames to teach—and to learn—the cognitive processes being referred to, plus their application to Bible translation? Further field-testing is needed to determine this, in different sociocultural settings.

29 For a sample of a study that applies the insights of relevance theory to the framing effect when evaluating the decision-making process of different individuals, see Gonzalez et.al. (2004).
The translation process may be delineated and described with respect to the original donor (SL) setting as well as the consumer (TL) setting by a set of intertwined conceptual frames (as above) that is specific to each context. One situational set of frames may differ considerably from the another in terms of content, interrelationships, prominence, etc.—a situation which thus has the potential to complicate, impede, or even block the cross-cultural communication process.

These conceptual differences may be discovered, analyzed, assessed, and strategically resolved (in the TL translation)—to a greater or lesser extent—by means of various types of macro- and micro-oriented, comparative-contrastive frame analysis and cotextual supplementation techniques (e.g., Hill 2003; Wendland 2008:226–239).

The translation process is perhaps better viewed as an instance of interlingual intertextuality (i.e., frame type number 9 above), that is, as manifesting varying degrees of conceptual correspondence and formal similarity between the respective SL and TL texts, rather than as being analogous to direct/indirect speech, which is inherently impossible between languages due to the different frames of reference that are inevitably evoked by the corresponding lexical signs/sets within the SL and TL.

The TL text of Scripture is also framed with respect to form, content, and function by a specific method of Bible translation as well as by the use/non-use of various kinds of paratextual supplements (footnotes, introductions, section headings, etc.).

A particular Bible translation project should be specifically and systematically framed by means of its official, communally-agreed job commission, or brief, in view of its intended target audience, communicative purpose (Skopos), medium of transmission, and primary setting of envisaged use.

The concept of framing applies also to the choice of a medium of message transmission and its implementation, e.g., when formatting in print the published text of Scripture: How can this best be done to promote increased legibility as well as greater audibility—i.e., to better articulate the written Word aloud to a listening audience?

The various concepts, categories, caveats, and recommendations summarized in this section are illustrated, in part, by means of the following practical example of biblical text interpretation and translation.

5. Applying the frames model to “familiarize” a well-known passage of Scripture

John 1:29 (NIV)—The next day John saw Jesus coming toward him and said, “Look, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!”

Τῇ ἐπαύριον βλέπει ηὸν Ἰηζοῦν ἐρτόμενον πρὸς αὐηόν καὶ λέγει, Ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς ηοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων ηὴν ἁμαρηίαν ηοῦ κόζμος.

The ten frames, or cognitive windows, that provide a hermeneutical framework for more fully exploring the sense and significance of a translation (i.e., to contextually familiarize the vernacular text) are applied below in summary form to the passage recorded in John 1:29. I will first overview the frames having the greatest relevance for the passage as a whole, as set within its present cotext, and then zero in specifically on the metaphor of Jesus, “the Lamb of God.”

1. Temporal: Verse 29 begins with a new time frame, the next day (Τῇ ἐπαύριον), which immediately raises the question: Day after what—which was the day before? This matter is actually more complicated than it first appears; thus, the Evangelist is developing a temporal framework that extends throughout the discourse unit that spans John 1:19–2:11. The present frame must therefore be fit and interpreted within the sequence: day one in 1:19–28; “the next (2nd) day” in 1:29–34; “the next (3rd)

30 Thus in terms of translation practice, a direct quotation would turn out to be the most formally correspondent, hence linguistically unnatural type of interlinear rendition. All normal types of translation, from the most literal to the most idiomatic, would be instances of indirect quotation. On the other hand, in terms of translation perception from the point of view of the TL community, any vernacular version is generally assumed to be a direct quotation of the biblical text.
day” in 1:35–42; “the next (4th) day” in 1:43–50; “on the third day (3 days later)” in 2:1–10. In this case, each temporal margin marks the onset of a new discourse unit within the larger passage.

2. **Spatial:** The spatial frame for John 1:29 is not specified; however, it may be assumed that it remains the same as that last mentioned. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the earlier locative frame is prominently recorded in the preceding verse, which seems to indicate that the setting does not change. This is “at Bethany on the other side of the Jordan (ἐν Βηθανίᾳ…πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου), where John was baptizing” (1:28). There are two places designated as Bethany in the Gospels—one near Jerusalem, where Mary, Martha, and Lazarus lived, and the one noted here, namely, on the eastern side of the Jordan River, probably, with respect to John’s ministry, in some more remote, wilderness area (a frame supplied by Mark 1:4; the exact site is unknown).

3. **Substantive:** There are four nominals in this passage: John, Lamb (Jesus), God, and world (all people). The cognitive scenarios that each noun evokes will be more fully described in the discussion of the following frame categories. The referents of the first three are quite clear, but theological controversy surrounds the fourth: Does the metonym world include believers as well as unbelievers, or only the former group? How wide is the window of semantic reference? I understand it as being universal, but that interpretation would be disputed by some theologians. There are, of course, translational implications, especially if the original figure of speech needs to be made explicit for the primary target audience. In that case, perhaps simply sinners/sinful people would be neutral enough.

4. **Eventive:** This passage constitutes a narrative report consisting of three surface actions: See, come, and say, and two actions enclosed within direct speech: Take away and sin. These event predicates may be represented together with their associated, case-related nominals (arguments) as follows: John sees (Jesus comes) and John says (Jesus/Lamb-of-God removes [people sin]). The focus particle “Look” (Ἴδε) might also be interpreted as another action embedded in the quotation, i.e., ([you people] see/look at! Jesus/Lamb-of-God and [he] removes/forgives…).31

5. **Attributive:** Hopefully, by this point in the current discourse of John chapter 1, all the attributives (characteristics, properties, qualities, etc.) associated with the substantives specified in the text have already been sufficiently framed in the listener’s mind. There remains the attributive relationships that are encoded within the two genitive constructions in the text’s surface structure: Lamb of God and sins of the world. The second is easier—a subjective genitive: People sin (or are sinful). The first genitive is also subjective, but in addition involves an implicit verb/action as well as an unstated attributive concept: God (sends/provides/offers) Lamb/his own Son (as a [redemptive/propietatory/expiatory] sacrifice).

6. **Social:** The personal substantives of any predication always evoke one or more sociocultural (including religious) frames into which the designated persons, individuals or groups, must be situated by means of the appropriate interpersonal role relationships. God, of course, occupies a unique, superordinate frame in terms of his divine attributes, but he has chosen in revelation to relate to human beings metaphorically as Father through the agency of his Son, who is, by virtue of the incarnation, also truly man (see further below). The role of John the Baptist in relation to Jesus of Nazareth has already sparked a controversy in John’s Gospel: Thus, the Baptist has refused to identify himself with the Christ (1:20), Elijah (1:21a), and the Prophet (1:21b), but instead refers to himself and his role as being just that of a humble “voice…[who is] to prepare the way for the Lord” (1:23; cf. Isa. 40:3). John has also alluded to his lowly servant status in relation to the coming Messiah (1:27), whom he now explicitly identifies in 1:29. John’s self-deprecation also creates a crisis of allegiance for his disciples,

---

31 As is typical of Johannine discourse, the theology underlying the relatively simple textual surface is very dense, and this may be elaborated in several ways. Thus, the singular form sin (ἁμαρηίαν) could be construed as an attributive, i.e., the sinful condition of people. The semantics of the verbal/participle “[who] takes away/lifts up/removes” (ὁ αἴρων) is also complex in this particular context. In this case, it is a matter of perspective—whose: John the Baptist’s (Jewish apocalyptic) or John the Evangelist’s (as represented throughout his Gospel)? I take the latter as being more likely—hence the notion of forgiveness being pronounced by God on the basis of the sacrificial death of his Son, the Lamb. See further below.
who must now decide whom to follow— their present prophetic figure, or the one to whom he is now designating as the Lamb of God (1:35–37).

7. **Locutionary**: The quotation in John 1:29 (“Behold the Lamb of God . . .”) begins a sequence of speech acts that together form a speech event which extends through another quote margin in 1:32a to the end of 1:34. The purpose of this entire locutionary framework in this first chapter of John’s Gospel is to present an authoritative, prophetic perspective (or voice) regarding the nature and work of the person to whom these words are being applied, namely, the (apparent) itinerant rabbi named Jesus. The speech event as a whole is thus, like v. 29 itself, a testimony (ἐμαρηύρησεν — v. 32a; v. 34) to the truth about who Jesus really is—and how John relates in his ministry to this Lamb of God. Questions of origin, status, and authority were crucial in that day and age of many prophetic pretenders (Jn. 1:19–25). In addition to the speech acts of assertion and certification, that of description is also merged into the complex locutionary frame of v. 29.32

8. **Logical**: The semantic organization (logical frame) of this passage may be represented in the form of a propositional display (semantic structure analysis) as follows (cf. Wendland 2002:ch. 3):

| The next day John saw [something]        | a = BASE + content (object) |
| Jesus (is) coming toward him              | b = BASE + ADDITION |
| and (John said, ____________           | c = BASE + content (quotation) |
| “(You people) Look at, ____________     | d = BASE + content (object) |
| (Jesus is) the Lamb of God, ___________ | e = BASE + attributive (or: means + result) |
| who takes away [something]              | f = BASE + content (object) |
| the sin of the world! (i.e., all people sin) | —— |

9. **Textual**: The interrelated concepts of Lamb of God and “take away the sin of the world” resonate within John’s Gospel itself (i.e., intratextually)—cf. Jn. 1:36, 16:8; cf. 1:9; 3:16; 6:51, but the former term (ἐμαρηύρησεν) is especially prominent in the book of Revelation (i.e., intertextually)—cf. Rev. 5:6, 12; 6:1, 16; 7:9–10, 14; 12:11; 13:8; 14:4; 15:3; 17:14; 19:7, 9; 21:9, 22–23; 22:1, 3. Important intertextual frames that enrich the understanding and interpretation of this verse are also elicited from other Old Testament books, not only those dealing with the ceremonial sacrificial system (e.g., Exo. 29:39–40; Lev. 4:32; 14:21; 23:12; Num. 6:14; Isa. 1:11), but more significantly, those pre-texts with more overt Messianic implications, e.g., Gen. 22:1–14 (offering of Isaac); Exo. 12:1–36 (Passover); Isa. 53:7 (cf. Acts 8:32; 1 Pet. 1:19).

10. **Generic**: John 1:29 does not constitute a genre on its own, but it is incorporated within the narrative (time-governed), more specifically gospel (person-oriented, speech-centered, cf. 20:30–31, 21:24–25), framework of John’s composition as a whole. A dramatic utterance beginning with an initial “behold” (>Login) could be classified as a discourse sub-type termed a prophetic declaration used to proclaim some important fact involving an identification, recognition, revelation, naming, classification, and so forth—as is common in the Gospels, e.g., Jn. 1:29, 36, 47; 4:35; 12:15; 16:32; Mt. 1:23; 10:16; Lk. 1:20, 31, 36; 7:27; 13:30; 23:29; 24:49; cf. Dan. 4:10, 13; 7:2, 5, 7, 8, 13 (but that is not the only function of this pragmatic particle).

6. **The Lamb of God metaphor—powerful blend of a pair of mental spaces**

It is necessary to further examine the substantive frame (#3 above) in order to unpack the comparative figure that is involved: Any metaphor involves a case of two primary attributive frames, one surrounding the topic, the other filling out the image. There are, in addition, many other secondary frames which form

---

32 Analysis of the locutionary frames of an extended discourse must also take into consideration such sociolinguistic features regarding “how or whether the ‘turn-taking’ of speakers is oriented toward each other’s words, their comparative social status, their respective gender, or the audience before which they are speaking” (Matthews 2008:75). Furthermore, from the perspective of the wider narrative frame, “[a]s characters interact, their words are understood within the context of their social position, identity, and location within the story and are further illustrated or magnified by socially recognized acts or gestures” (Matthews 2008:107).
the rest of the hypertext that is associated with the figurative text (and cotext) being interpreted. The combination of these two windows/frames produces a cognitive blend that constitutes the central meaning of the metaphor (any secondary frames which manifest weaker implicatures).

The cognitive theory of conceptual blending is based on the insight that true creativity of any type essentially involves bringing together elements from different semantic domains. In the words of Fauconnier and Turner (hereafter F&T), two prominent researchers in the field:33

> Conceptual blending operates largely behind the scenes. We are not consciously aware of its hidden complexities…. Almost invisibly to consciousness, conceptual blending choreographs vast networks of conceptual meaning, yielding cognitive products that, at the conscious level, appear simple…. The products of conceptual blending are ubiquitous. (2002:1)

Conceptual blending is the less technical reference to what F&T term the network model of conceptual integration, which involves the figurative heuristic notion of mental spaces (40). These psychological constructs (or frames) may be temporal, spatial, eventive, personal, objective, circumstantial, modal, or hypothetical in nature, whether the reference is to actual or fictional settings and situations. They are activated in the mind as any perceptual, rational being moves mentally from (or combines) one cognitive-connotative frame of reference to (with) another. In summary:

> Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for the purposes of local understanding and action…. Mental spaces are connected to long-term schematic knowledge called frames, such as the frame of walking along a path, and to long-term specific knowledge, such as a memory of the time you climbed Mount Rainier in 2001…. Mental spaces are very partial. They contain [cognitive] elements and are typically structured by frames. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold. Mental spaces can be used generally to model dynamic mappings in thought and language (loc.cit.).34

I wish to apply, admittedly in a rather superficial and cursory manner, certain aspects of the theory of mental spaces and conceptual blending simply to suggest something of the dynamic cognitive (and frequently also emotive and evaluative) activity that takes place when a skillful narrator is telling his tale for an attentive and informed local audience. I will further narrow my consideration to the metaphoric process of visualization that presumably occurs when contextually aware listeners interpret and apply the short, but semantically multifaceted segment of text, “Behold, the Lamb of God!” (Ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς θεοῦ)

Stockwell sums up the operation of conceptual blending as follows (97–98):

---

33 All the references to Fauconnier and Turner in this section come from their 2002 volume, chapter three in particular. Similarly, all the Stockwell citations come from chapter seven of his book (2002). Koops comments as follows (2000:4): “Once you see how mental spaces work and how they are connected to each other, it is not difficult to see how content from two mental spaces can combine to yield a third space. This is called ‘conceptual blending.’ The third space inherits partial structure from the input spaces and has emergent structure of its own…. There are also non-linguistic examples of blending, like the computer ‘Desktop’ interface, constructed on the basis of two conceptual units, the input of traditional computer commands, and the input of ordinary work in an office. Cross-space mapping matches computer files to paper files, directories to folders, etc., right down to the dustbin.”

34 This may be compared with the more literary-oriented perspective of Coulson 2001:21–25: “Mental space theory…is a theory of referential structure…mental spaces can be thought of as temporary containers for relevant information about a particular domain. A mental space contains a partial representation of the entities and relations of a particular scenario as perceived, imagined, remembered, or otherwise understood by a speaker…. Spaces represent such diverse things as hypothetical scenarios, beliefs, quantified domains, thematically defined domains, fictional scenarios, and situations located in time and space. As discourse unfolds, the language user extends existing spaces by adding new elements and relations to the cognitive models already evoked…. A new space is also set up when utterances concern objects or events that require different background assumptions from those of the current space…. Meaning construction thus consists of mapping cognitive models from space to space while keeping track of the links between spaces and between elements and their counterparts…. [M]eaning always emerges from understanding in a particular context.” Missing, however, from this cognitive view of perception, understanding, and “meaning” construction is any substantial consideration of emotions, attitudes, values, and other connotative elements that characterize most communication events, certainly those found in most artistically composed literary works. Mental spaces may be analyzed in terms of a conceptual “base,” or starting point, a “focus” of attention, and a particular “viewpoint,” or perspective, one that includes personal attitudes and emotions (Matthews 2008:36).
This involves a [cognitive] mapping between two [mental] spaces, and common general nodes and relationships across the spaces are abstracted into a generic space. Specific features which emerge from this mapping then form a new space, the blend. Conceptual blends are the mechanism by which we can hold the properties of two spaces together, such as in metaphorical or allegorical thinking, scientific or political analogy, comparisons and imaginary domains involving characters from disparate areas.

In the evocation and elaboration of new ideas then, including metaphor, four mental spaces are hypothetically involved, two input spaces and another pair of consequent composite spaces:

- **Target** (base) space (1): the verbal or textual starting point for the construction of a conceptual network; this is the tenor or topic, which is the familiar, real-world oriented, or literal element of a metaphor—what is being directly spoken about or referred to in terms of semantic sense and pragmatic significance.
- **Source** (image) space (2): the figurative concept that is used to expand and/or develop the initial conceptual space (1) by presenting a novel, non-literal perspective; this is the vehicle or image of a metaphor—what is being employed to illuminate or illustrate the Target in the particular verbal context in which it is being used.
- **Generic** (abstract) space (3): created from selective cross-space mapping as specific counterparts or correspondences between the two input spaces (Target + Source, 1 + 2) are initially brought together in one’s mind; these are the crucial cognitive elements (semantic and pragmatic components) which the Target and Source have in common, or which form an innovative and insightful bond within the current predication (i.e., the comparative ground of a metaphor).
- **Blended** (metaphoric) space (4): selected features of the generic space (3) become further cognitively activated as implicatures by the discourse context, that is, according to the principle of relevance in conjunction with the wider extralinguistic, intertextual, situational and circumstantial setting; these in turn form a virtual emergent structure (4) in which new relations and aspects of meaning are evoked by inference and/or intuition, often with additional connotative (emotive, attitudinal, aesthetic, etc.) overtones and rhetorical impact.

My brief application of the theoretical notions presented above is focused upon the multifaceted metaphor, Jesus is the lamb—(the unique, specific one) of God, which in a literary sense represents a perspectival blend, namely, that of the (implied) narrator, John the Evangelist, together with that of the focal character at this juncture in the account, John the Baptist, who utters the picturesque phrase under consideration. The visualization process, which is depicted in the following chart, depends of course on a common mental perspective: Both Johns ostensibly assume that their listeners (the implied audience) share the cognitive spaces that allow this dramatic identificational metaphor to operate, thus stimulating their imagination in the direction of several new areas of thought, being enriched by the intertextual framework of the Hebrew (or Greek) Scriptures. However, from the point of view of the likely target audience of this Gospel, the much wider perspective of John the Evangelist will be adopted to guide the process of construing the intended sense of the focal figure, which is intended to evoke the epitome of submissive sacrifice.

According to my understanding then, the cognitive theory of mental spaces (interrelated conceptual complexes, or semantic mini-frames) may be described (in a very simplified manner) with reference to the example of Jesus, the Lamb of God as follows (cf. Stockwell 2002:97–98; Fauconnier and Turner 2006:301–315):

---

35 I have somewhat modified the standard definitions of these (cf. Stockwell 2002:96–98; F&T 2002:41–44).
36 The referential target may also embrace some complex and/or abstract concept(s), e.g., “the kingdom of God” which is God’s sovereign rule on behalf of his people, a notion which obviously involves various degrees of anthropomorphism as well.
37 “The generic space consists of the intersection of the input spaces, that is, the conceptual structure that they share, while the blend space consists of the combination of the input spaces, where elements from each interact with each other. The result of this interaction, according to mental space theory, is that the blend space will have an ‘emergent structure’ with inferences not predictable from the individual source frames” (Shead 2007:55–56).
At the heart of the communicative event is a conceptual blending process, which is a cross-space mapping activity, that brings together the ideational counterparts of two distinct mental spaces, each of which has its own larger cognitive frame of reference (schema). In the case at hand, there is a base (target) space that is elicited through John’s discourse (and the incorporated, cited speech of John the Baptist) by means of the surface relationship and imagery connected with Jesus the promised Messiah and his ministry.

Being guided by the primary interpretive framework of Scripture then, hearers of the figurative Lamb of God utterance are likely to project another, hypothetical (source) space (2) upon the original base space (1), namely, the relationship between Christ and his messianic mission to/in this world. Accordingly, selected common features between these two spaces, the base and the hypothetical, are conceptually linked and integrated within a generic space (3), e.g., two very distinct personal parties/entities are variously associated (e.g., by metonymy) in the biblical religious setting of blood sacrifice. From this generic space a new emergent structure is mentally generated, one that is not the same as the base or the hypothetical space, but which combines analogical elements from both to form a new blended space (4), as shown in the table below.

The entire cognitive process depicted below serves to stimulate a fresh way of thinking about the significance of the conjoined common constituents within the current (religious, evangelistic) setting of communication and all relevant background knowledge available to the participants (the original, and all subsequent audiences). Within the hermeneutical context of received Scripture (cross-referentiality with the levitical code of the Torah and Isaianic messianic symbolism in particular), this would most likely be a sacrificial scenario analogous to the ritual system specified in the OT (LXX). The amazing (shocking?) thing, however, is that John’s Messiah is not depicted as a mighty Warrior-King as most Jews of that day expected (cf. Isa. 9:6–7; 11:2–5, 10–11; 32:1) but as a lowly loving Shepherd (cf. Isa. 40:11), who ironically is also identified with the Passover Lamb of sacrifice, and perhaps also the vicariously banished scapegoat (cf. Isa. 52:13–53:12).38

The purpose of this analytical exercise is simply to illustrate how the respective mental spaces for the metaphor of the Lamb of God as applied to Christ in John 1:29 might be inferentially filled out, at least as fully as a translation team’s time and expertise allows. Certainly the task can be carried out intuitively by competent, well-informed translators; however, the mental space methodology illustrated above could act as a helpful heuristic procedure to carry out in the case of individual semantically more complex passages, especially where more complicated metaphorical (or novel metonymic) language is involved.

In any case, if the translators are preparing a meaning-based version, they might come to the conclusion that the notion of sacrifice needs to be built into the vernacular text, not only to promote the understanding of the principal TI audience (e.g., Chewa: Mwanawankhosa wiwipereka wa Mulungu “the Lamb of God who offers himself”), but also to prevent possible misunderstanding, e.g., the child of a sheep (mwanaambele), which is regarded as an exotic (and rather stupid!) European domestic animal among the cattle-rearing Tonga people of Zambia. Some of the additional information recorded in the four quadrants above could also be used in the composition of a study note on this passage or as part of a glossary entry attached to the title Lamb (of God). Thus, the time and effort expended to systematically explicate these figurative semantic relationships would not be wasted.39

38 An allusion to young Isaac (Genesis 22) may also have been active: “The Jewish scholar [Geza] Vermes says that the sacrifice of Isaac was a prominent image in the early Passover celebration, much more in Jesus’ time than today” (Spangler and Tverberg 2009:243).

39 “Rhetorical figures are realized on the basis of conceptual domains [i.e., frames of reference], creating categories. We thus have access to a kind of reality that would otherwise be indeterminate [or unexplainable in human terms, i.e., spiritual/theological realities]. In other words, we can say that human beings have the cognitive ability to [perceive and] organize the world [whether seen, unseen, or imagined] in figurative terms. This ability allows them to categorize reality, providing it with structure. In this sense figurative activity is the ability to construct world images employed in reality” (Arduini 2009:1, added material in brackets). As illustrated in the preceding passage from John, the Scriptures are packed with such imagery and rhetorical figures. The analytical tools of cognitive linguistics, frame semantics in particular, allows us to understand, interrelate, teach, apply, and communicate (also via translation) these spiritual realities in an efficient and effective manner.
### Target Space (1)

**Jesus of Nazareth** is the person being ostensibly referred to by John ("Behold"). Jesus has begun his teaching and preaching ministry, perhaps even performing several mighty works.

The Evangelist has already given this Jesus an elaborate introduction: He is the Son of God—the Father (1:18, i.e., wholly divine), who was also fully human (1:14), a being who abundantly manifested God’s glory (1:14) as well as godly love and Covenant faithfulness (i.e. grace and truth—1:14, 17; cf. Exo. 33:18–19, 34:5–7) in order to give all people who “received him (by faith) the right to become the children of God” (Joh 1:12). Jesus is the eternal Word (1:1), the Creator (1:3, 10), the Light (1:5, 7–10; cf. 3:19), the begotten from the Father (1:14, 18; 3:16), and the Lord (1:23, by implication). John the Evangelist then identifies Jesus as being the unique, promised Messiah (Savior-Deliverer-Redeemer) of the Hebrew Scriptures through the explicit testimony of John the Baptist (1:6–8, 19–28; 3:17). The messianic intertextual setting of Isaiah would have been evoked by John’s reference to his own prophetic ministry on behalf of the Lord (Jn. 1:23b—cf. Isa. 40:3).

### Source Space (2)

The lamb (when fully grown, i.e., a sheep) was perhaps the most valuable domestic animal in the economic and religious setting of Israel/the Jews in ANE times. Virtually every part of the animal was used, from its horns to its fleshy tail. As in the case of goats, sheep provided for all the necessities of life, both physical (food, clothing) and religious. Thus, sheep and lambs were prescribed clean animals in many of the sacrificial rituals stipulated in the Mosaic Law, including the daily burnt offering (e.g., Exo. 29:38–46; Lev. 1:4)—but specifically an unblemished lamb in the central feast of the Passover (Ex. 12:1–13).

Although, technically speaking, the Passover lamb was not regarded as a sacrifice, in popular thought it is very likely that it was viewed as such since, by the first century CE, the Temple priests had taken over the responsibility of killing these lambs selected for the Passover celebration (formerly the responsibility of the heads of households/clans). Thus, by conceptual association with the sheep sacrificed in the routine Temple rituals, there may well have been strong redemptive symbolism associated with these Passover lambs of life.

### Blended Space (4)

Jesus is directly identified by John as being associated via the (def.) lamb figure with God (1:29). This creates a crucial intimacy based on the Generic Space and the narrative context: Jesus is the supreme sacrifice supplied God himself to remove the polluting wickedness and damning guilt of sinners.

There is also the suggestion that Jesus’ role as a sacrificial lamb will actually require and ultimately result in his death at some point in the future (cf. Jn. 11:50–51; 12:24, 33; 18:32; cf. 1 Cor. 5:7; 1 Pet. 1:19—Jesus as the Passover Lamb, sacrificed on behalf of sinners). The Passover connection appears to be especially strong in this Gospel since John takes pains to point out that Jesus was crucified during the time of the annual Passover celebration (Jn. 18:28; 19:14, 31; cf. 1 Cor. 5:7) and even fulfilled a (typological) prophecy in that redemptive event, i.e., when he died without a bone of his body being broken (Jn. 19:36; cf. Exo. 12:46; Num. 9:12). The identification of Jesus the Christ with a sacrificial lamb would have naturally been strengthened through the prophetic allusion created by Isaiah 53:6–7, and perhaps even in the minds of some (Jewish rabbis at least) with the earlier lamb provided by God in place of Isaac (Gen. 22:8; cf. v. 13). The notion of redemptive sacrifice is brought out too by the context of the metaphor lamb of God, which “takes away sin” (cf. Jn. 3:5; Heb. 9:28; 1 Pet. 2:24). Thus, “to bear sin” (aireis) may involve some form of expiation (e.g., Lev. 10:17; 1 Sam. 15:25; 25:28) and/or the forgiveness of sin’s guilt by bearing the penalty attached to it on behalf of others (e.g., Num. 14:33–34; Isa. 53:4–12; Ez. 18:19–20).42

---

40 During a given text analysis this “generic space” could be readily filled out by the data provided by a good semantic domain dictionary like de Blois’ *Semantic Domain Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew*, available online at [www.sdbh.org](http://www.sdbh.org). A worthwhile project would be for Louw and Nida’s *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (1988) to be reworked into the format of the SDBH, for both theoretical and well as practical reasons, i.e., to facilitate electronic inter-textual lexical comparison (yet including also pertinent rabbinic sources, e.g., the Mishnah).

41 “…early Judaism attached the nuances of sacrifice to the Passover” (Keener 2003:454).

42 According to some scholars, the apocalyptic Lamb identified with Christ in Revelation (ch. 5:6) evokes a different set of intertextual frames via Greek intertestamental literature—namely, that of a great messianic deliverer of God’s people, who is depicted as a ram which leads the flock (1 Enoch 90; cf. Testament of Joseph 19:8–11; Testament of Benjamin 3:8) (Green and McKnight 1992:433; Keener 2003:452). Other commentators, however, still view the Passover sacrificial symbolism as being paramount in Revelation 5—“…the lamb whose blood delivers God’s people from the coming plagues (7:3)…” (Keener 2003:454). Much more speculative and improbable is this interpretation: “There is but a single lamb in all creation that merits the title ‘lamb of God,’ and that is the constellation labeled Aries by the Latins. In the book of Revelation, this constellation is directly identified as ‘the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David’ (Rev. 5:5), that is, the Messiah of Israel. The same is true here in John’s Gospel, where John the prophet identifi-
6.1. Conclusion: Frames of reference—Windows on the world of Bible translation

Frames are the conceptual bedrock for understanding anything. People are only able to interpret words, images, actions, or text of any kind because their brains fit those texts into a conceptual system that gives them order and meaning. Just a few cues—a word, an image—trigger whole frames that determine meaning. That’s why the choice of words becomes important (The Praxis Project 2005:6, added italics).

If the preceding set of assertions is true for thinking and communicating within the same language and cultural setting (and I assume that they are), then what are the implications for Bible translation? Not only must translators correctly interpret the conceptual, contextualized frames of reference that the various Hebrew and Greek words, expressions, grammatical constructions, discourse structures, and stylistic devices suggest in terms of the original text, but they must also seek to evoke corresponding cognitive, emotive, and evaluative frames in the minds of their intended audience, using appropriate, idiomatic TL textual forms along with whatever auxiliary helps and hermeneutical aids are available. In short, the closest possible literary (artistic-rhetorical) as well as pragmatic functional equivalence is the primary goal (Wendland 2006).43

Has the frames of reference approach helped us to behold the biblical text and its translation any more clearly? Such frames are simply different conceptual lenses, including denotative along with connotative perspectives, that are selected, prioritized, combined, embedded, and interpreted according to the intuitive principle of relevance (mental processing cost versus the potential gain in conceptual enrichment) with regard to a particular text in conjunction with its linguistic as well as extralinguistic context. The utility of this model as a teaching tool can only be evaluated of course by how well it works out in practice with actual student-translators in comparison (or in combination) with alternative pedagogical approaches.

Some translation consultants have reported that the concept frames of reference is rather difficult to translate and teach in their language-culture.44 Perhaps the widespread notion of windows in connection with computer use would be an easier way to understand this cognitive-inferential approach45 and to apply

43 On the notion of “equivalence” in relation to “frames of reference” in contemporary translation studies, Ardunii makes the following pertinent comments (2009:2): “Even the problem of equivalence can be completely reformulated and rejuvenated, even though TS [ew: Translation Studies] declared it, often obtusely, old fashioned. Sometimes the non-equivalence between languages depends on the type and amount of information specified in the cognitive frame. [Relevance theory is particularly ‘relevant’ here since it studies the role that implied information plays in human communication.] The Italian word ‘casa’ (house) presumes a frame that specifies some important structural characteristics. In English the word ‘house’ has a different meaning from ‘home’. Both ‘house’ and ‘home’ when translated in Italian are translated into ‘casa’. But this translation is a false equivalence; it is only a partial equivalence that is limited to the profile. The presupposed dominions of the two terms are very different. ‘House’ is outlined by physical objects while ‘home’ belongs to the affective sphere. It is assumed that abstract dominions from these two various types of conceptualization are related to two various spheres of cognition: the material one and that emotional one…. When analyzing the nature of the meanings of the words in different languages we often don’t consider the differences at the level of frame/dominion that in many cases are culturally determined. Take for example the illustration of Croft and Cruse (2004:21). They point to the verb ‘to genuflect’, which is a movement of the body, more or less the same as the concept of kneeling down. But ’genuflect’ belongs to a much more specific frame, which is Catholic liturgical use. One can actually dig even deeper since ‘genuflect’ is really an ecclesiastical Latin word ‘domesticating and translating the Greek verb ‘proskunein’ which had the widest of usage in pagan cultic, administrative, and royal frameworks. Often the frames are very culturally specific, and the idea that translating necessarily implies a loss simply means that there is a non-equivalence of frames.”
44 As was noted above, the term “frames” might give the impression of something solid and immovable (and for some folks, e.g., “fundamentalists,” they may be just that rigid!), but the frames of reference that I have in mind are quite different. Thus, for most people they are quite flexible, fluid, and contextually shaped; furthermore, they frequently merge and overlap with each other during the discussion of a more complex or abstract topic, e.g., during a religious discussion on the person and nature of Christ.
45 I discovered that some time ago Rob Koops anticipated this vital application of the Windows metaphor: “For those who have used the Windows computer program, a good way to think about ‘mental spaces’ is to think of opening a new ‘window.’ The old one may still be there, accessible but hidden behind the more recent one. You can be ‘in’ a new
it in turn to text analysis and its synthesis in another linguistic and cultural setting. Certainly, any translators who are using the Paratext program (including the UBS Translator’s Handbook commentaries) plus Source Language Tools would be familiar with the operation of such flexible windows, which offer a hypertextual, easy-access technology to facilitate the translation task. Each text window of Paratext 7, for example, could be filled in by the contents of one or another of the ten cognitive frames of discourse organization discussed earlier. Perhaps this marriage of ideas—frames and windows—is worth further testing and possible refinement, not only with respect to the practice of Bible translating, but also when contemplating the organization and operation of entire translation programs (i.e., the so-called organizational frame of Bible Translation: Frames of Reference; see Wilt 2003:46–55; Wilt and Wendland 2008:ch. 4).

In any case, whether we choose to call the varied, yet closely integrated conceptual dimensions of a certain biblical text cognitive frames, mental models, schemas, scenarios, windows, or something else, these considerations are a vital aspect of any exegetical study. A combined cognitive-linguistic/literary framework serves to reveal and help organize the salient features of semantic as well as pragmatic importance—all those aspects of meaning (in the wider, encyclopedic sense) that need to be re-presented or made accessible in one way or another, either as part of, or alongside a given translation of Scripture. In particular (since this implicit aspect of meaning is often ignored), such a multi-frame, multidimensional investigation helps one to identify structural boundaries and points of special thematic and/or hortatory significance (i.e., peak and climax) in the original text so that they may be marked appropriately in the TL translation.

A contrastive frame analysis is also frequently necessary to locate and help resolve potential problem points in the process of translation. This refers to those areas in the original text that are likely to cause some type of difficulty when reconceptualizing and re-expressing these concepts in another language system and cultural framework. Occasionally (given translators with the necessary expertise and experience), it will be possible to effect the necessary conceptual enrichment and/or frame reconstruction (e.g., modifying, deleting, or strengthening certain crucial cognitive assumptions and textual implications) within the translated text itself. But more often, such conceptual-connotative enrichment must be accomplished by means of the supplementary paratext (e.g., footnotes, cross-references, sectional headings, summaries, index, glossary, etc.) or through extratextual helps (e.g., commentaries, study Bibles, dictionaries, and other text-focused reference works).\textsuperscript{46}

My conclusion is that framing and frames are handy conceptual metaphors to use when discussing, teaching, or actually implementing the interlocking cognitive context-building and text-compositional phases of interlingual, cross-cultural communication. As this interdisciplinary investigation has sought to demonstrate, frame analysis (and synthesis) is a tool well-grounded in current scholarly research and writing that is intended to render the translation process more transparent, systematic, accurate, complete, and hence also successful.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46} This “extratextual setting” would include the important teaching-preaching ministry of the wider local church community and para-church organizations, such as the national Bible Society.

\textsuperscript{47} On completing an earlier draft of this article (March 7, 2008), I received the following notice regarding a conference on the theme: “Translation frames: Gateways and gatekeeping” that was held at the University of Manchester on June 6–July 1, 2008 (www.llc.manchester.ac.uk/ctis/activities/conferences/translationframes): “However translation is defined or understood, whether in Eurocentric and modern Arabic ideas of ‘transferring across’, or in terms such as the Hindi anuvad (speaking after, following) and rupantar (change in form), the Igbo tapia and kowa (to break up and tell or narrate differently), [the Chewa kumasulira (to untie),] or the Chinese fanyi (turning over and interpreting/exchanging), the notion of some kind of transformative act seems to be unavoidable. One way of conceptualising these transformative acts is to employ the notion of framing, which has been defined as ‘strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present...a particular position within a certain perspective.’ Yet, framing is a broad concept used in many disciplines, and might also be thought of in other ways” (italics added).
References


Tymoczko, Maria. 2010. Western metaphorical discourses implicit in translation studies. In St. André, 109–143.


